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This research aimed at the evaluation of the psychometric properties of the Theory of
Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.). Th.o.m.a.s. is a semi-structured interview meant
to evaluate a person’s Theory of Mind (ToM). It is composed of several questions
organized in four scales, each focusing on one of the areas of knowledge in which
such faculty may manifest itself: Scale A (I-Me) investigates first-order first-person ToM;
Scale B (Other-Self) investigates third-person ToM from an allocentric perspective; Scale
C (I-Other) again investigates third-person ToM, but from an egocentric perspective;
and Scale D (Other-Me) investigates second-order ToM. The psychometric proprieties
of Th.o.m.a.s. were evaluated in a sample of 156 healthy persons: 80 preadolescent
and adolescent (aged 11–17 years, 42 females) and 76 adults (aged from 20 to 67
years, 35 females). Th.o.m.a.s. scores show good inter-rater agreement and internal
consistency; the scores increase with age. Evidence of criterion validity was found as
Scale B scores were correlatedwith those of an independent instrument for the evaluation
of ToM, the Strange Stories task. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) showed good fit
of the four-factors theoretical model to the data, although the four factors were highly
correlated. For each of the four scales, Rasch analyses showed that, with few exceptions,
items fitted the Partial credit model and their functioning was invariant for gender and age.
The results of this study, along with those of previous researches with clinical samples,
show that Th.o.m.a.s. is a promising instrument to assess ToM in different populations.
Keywords: Theory of Mind, Th.o.m.a.s., validation of ToM tests, social cognition, metacognition
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study was to investigate the psychometric properties of the Theory of Mind
Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s.; Bosco et al., 2009), a semi-structured interview developed for
the assessment of Theory of Mind (ToM) in adolescents and adults (healthy and with clinical
pathologies). ToM is the capacity to ascribe mental states like emotions, intentions, desires, and
beliefs to oneself and the others and to use this knowledge to predict, interpret, and explain the
relevant actions and behaviors (Premack and Woodruff, 1978).
The classic tests for the assessment of ToM, the false beliefs tasks, were created in the domain
of developmental psychology (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). They require
the subject to recognize another person’s beliefs when they differ from those of the subject herself,
under the assumption that this is the only certain proof of the availability of a theory of mind
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(Dennett, 1978). False belief tasks investigate first- or second-
order ToM. The former (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) is the
ability to understand a person’s beliefs about a state of the world,
whereas the latter is the ability to ascribe nested mental states,
i.e., to understand a person’s beliefs about someone else’s beliefs
(Perner and Wimmer, 1985). Empirical data have shown that
children and clinical populations find second-order ToM tasks
more difficult to solve than first-order ones (Mazza et al., 2001;
Wellman and Liu, 2004). Due to the poor test-retest reliability
for the scores obtained at false-belief questions, initial attempts
to validate false belief tasks did not give fully satisfactory results
(Mayes et al., 1996).
Only few studies have explored the psychometric properties of
ToM tests. One is the Theory of Mind (TOM) test (Muris et al.,
1999). This test, which was devised for children of 5–12 years, is
an interview composed of vignettes, stories, and drawings about
which the child is asked to answer several questions. The test
was administered to a sample of children with developmental
disorders and a healthy one, showing that it is able to discriminate
between the two conditions and that its scores have good internal
consistency and inter-rater reliability, and sufficient test-retest
stability.
Other ToM tasks, like the Strange Stories (Happé, 1994) and
the Faux pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), were created to evaluate
more sophisticated aspects of ToM in children older than four
years of age. The Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) assesses the
comprehension of complex mental states like misunderstanding
and double bluffing, which require understanding social contexts.
It has been used with children, both in healthy (e.g., Devine
and Hughes, 2013) and pathological conditions (e.g., Charman
et al., 2001; Kaland et al., 2002; Velloso et al., 2013) as also in
adolescents and adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD)
and Asperger syndrome (Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kaland
et al., 2005),
Although the tests discussed so far were first created for use
in developmental psychology they have often been employed,
possibly with some adaptation, in adults with clinical disorders
like schizophrenia (see for example Mazza et al., 2001; Pickup
and Frith, 2001) in addition to other specific tests, mostly
involving picture sequencing tasks (see for example Langdon
et al., 2001; Brüne and Bodenstein, 2005; Brüne et al., 2016).
To our knowledge, however, only few psychometrics evaluations
of these tests in healthy adults have been provided. One is
the widely used Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (RME;
Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) originally created to assess ToM in
children with Asperger Syndrome. It consists of photographs of
the eyes region: the subject is asked to match each picture with
the semantic definition of a specific emotion (e.g., “worried,”
“annoyed”). Several studies of the psychometric properties of
the RME were conducted with healthy adults in different
countries, but not with unanimous results: some studies found
a low level of internal coherence (Voracek and Dressler, 2006;
Harkness et al., 2010; Olderbak et al., 2015) whereas others
found an acceptable one (Serafin and Surian, 2004; Vellante
et al., 2013). Reports of test-retest reliability RME scores
range from acceptable (Yildirim et al., 2011) to good (Vellante
et al., 2013). RME is commonly used to assess ToM; however,
because judgments are only based on eyes expression, it only
focuses on a specific kind of mental state, namely recognition
of emotions, and therefore is able to assess only one facet
of ToM.
Recently, more attention has been paid to psychometric
properties in the creation of novel ToM tests. These tests have
mainly been designed to investigate ToM in children with
ASD. For example, the Animated Theory of Mind Inventory
for Children (ATOMIC; Beaumont and Sofronoff, 2008) was
created to assess ToM in children with Asperger Syndrome.
The tool consists of cartoons depicting a range of themes, each
followed by two multiple-choice questions. The ATOMIC has
proved capable of discriminating between clinical and control
groups and appears to be significantly correlated with the
Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994). Also the Theory of Mind
Inventory (Hutchins et al., 2012) was developed to assess ToM
in individuals with ASD. It works by asking the parents to
compile a questionnaire consisting of statements toward which
the interviewee expresses agreement or disagreement on a
continuous metrics. The instrument appears to have excellent
test-retest reliability and internal consistency. Another recently
developed tool, created for children with high functioning ASD
is the Comic Strip Task (CST; Sivaratnam et al., 2012). It consists
of vignettes investigating the child’s comprehension of other
persons’ beliefs, intentions, and emotional states and it appears
to have moderate internal consistency and good discriminant
validity.
A different set of clinical tools, specifically created for adults,
investigates different, albeit related cognitive ability, namely self-
reflection (Fonagy et al., 1991), and metacognition (Semerari
et al., 2003). Self-reflection is the capacity to understand and
reason upon one’s own and other’s states like feelings, thoughts,
fantasies, beliefs, and desires (Gergely et al., 2002). Fonagy et al.
(1998) developed the Reflective Functional scale (RF) to study
the subjects’ ability to reflect upon their childhood experience
in mentalizing terms. The coding for the RF is based on the
interviewee’s ability to reflect on several relevant passages of
the Adult Attachment Interview (Main and Goldwyn, 1990).
Despite the possible theoretical similarity between the notion
of self-reflection, as investigated by the RF scale, and that
(or those) of ToM, a study of Taylor et al. (2008) conducted
with persons with autism, failed to find significant correlations
between their performance on the RF and ToM, at least as
assessed with the RME test discussed above (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001). Most studies available in the literature that use the RF
are based on the Adult Attachment Interview; however, recent
researches have applied the RF to other clinical interviews,
e.g., the Brief Reflective Functioning Interview (BRFI; Rudden
et al., 2005) and the Reflective Functioning Rating Scale (RFRS;
Meehan et al., 2009). Moreover, in a recent review on Reflective
Functioning Katznelson (2014, p. 115) concluded that “more
research regarding reliability and validity of these measures -
BRFI and RFRS- is necessary to qualify these more thoroughly.”
Still another limitation of the RF is that it yields a unique
total score, thus underestimating the complexity of mentalizing
activities (Choi-Kain and Gunderson, 2008; Gullestad and
Wilberg, 2011).
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Metacognition is a wider construct. In Flavell’s (1979) original
definition, it includes any thought process that has as its object
the mind itself in its various interpersonal, emotional, and
cognitive dimensions. Examples of metacognition are memory,
perception, or motivation. To study it, Semerari et al. (2012)
developed the Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI), a
semi-structured interview aimed to investigate different aspects
of metacognition; MAI is an adaptation of the Metacognition
assessment Scale (MAS; Semerari et al., 2003). Semerari et al.
(2012) investigated the psychometric proprieties of the MAI on
a sample of non-clinical subjects. Factors analysis showed a two
factors hierarchical structure corresponding to the two main
metacognitive functions, the “self domain,” which is the ability
to monitor and integrate mental aspects and the way in which a
person is aware of her mental state in relation to her behavior,
and the “other domain,” which is the ability to adopt another
person’s perspective and to differentiate between different forms
of representations, such as imagination, expectations, and reality.
The inter-rater reliability and the internal consistency of MAI in
these two domains were acceptable (Semerari et al., 2012).
Despite being obviously related to ToM, metacognition
is a wider construct, including more sophisticated mental
functions (Semerari et al., 2003, 2012) than the former, originally
considered by Premack and Woodruff (1978) as a unitary
faculty. Accordingly, most available tools for assessing it have
embedded this assumption into their methodological approach
and material structure. In time, however, it has been argued
that ToM has a much more complex nature, thus opening the
way to the possibility of decomposing it into different aspects or
components.
A first such operation is the distinction between third-person
ToM, i.e., the ability to attribute mental states to another person,
and first-person ToM, i.e., the ability to attribute mental states
to oneself (Nichols and Stich, 2003; Dimaggio et al., 2008). To
understand oneself and to understand another person appear
to be different activities, mediated by different processes and
recruiting different kinds of knowledge. Within the domain of
third-person ToM a further distinction, proposed by Frith and
De Vignemont (2005), takes place between an egocentric and an
allocentric perspective. In the former, the mental states of other
agents are represented in relation to the self, while in the latter
they are represented independently from the self. Still another
difference occurs between first-order and second-order ToM.
First-order ToM is the ability to grasp someone’s mental states
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983), while second-order ToM is the
ability to infer what someone thinks about a third person’s mental
states (Perner and Wimmer, 1985). Studies in the developmental
(Wellman and Liu, 2004) and in the clinical domains (e.g., in
patients with schizophrenia, Mazza et al., 2001) show that first-
order tasks are easier to be solved that second-order ones.
Further differences may be drawn between different types of
mental states that can be dealt with by the agent. It is commonly
theorized in other areas of cognitive science that at least three
such types, namely beliefs, desires, and intentions, are needed to
capture an agent’s mind (see e.g., Rao and Georgeff, 1992; Tirassa,
1999; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008), and theories in developmental
psychology also point to the idea that the comprehension of
volitional and epistemic states may be acquired at different ages
(e.g., Wellman, 1991; Wellman and Liu, 2004). Furthermore, it
might be sensible to distinguish between different ways to which
ToM may be put to use, e.g., in understanding or predicting
another agent’s behavior, in attempting to affect it, and so on.
The Th.o.m.a.s. (Bosco et al., 2009) is a semi-structured
open-question interview devised to capture these various facets
of ToM, namely first vs. third person, first vs. second order,
egocentric vs. allocentric, different kind of mental states and
different uses that can be made of them, and thus to provide a
broad assessment of ToM abilities both in healthy (adolescents
and adults) and clinical conditions. Having a single instrument
capable of assessing several different facets or components of
ToM allows to directly compare how they function in the same
individual or clinical sample.
Th.o.m.a.s. has been used in patients with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia (Bosco et al., 2009), preadolescents and
adolescents (Bosco et al., 2014b), sex offenders (Castellino
et al., 2011), persons with alcohol use disorder (Bosco et al.,
2014a), persons with congenital heart disease (Chiavarino et al.,
2015), and persons with bulimia (Laghi et al., 2014). In all
these types of subjects Th.o.m.a.s. has systematically proved a
useful clinical tool, capable of discriminating between healthy
control and non-healthy participants. Furthermore, it keeps into
account that different kinds of patients may in principle, and
actually do in practice, show different patterns of performance
to the various ToM components mentioned above. In particular,
persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, persons with alcohol
use disorder, and sex offenders (Bosco et al., 2009, 2014a;
Laghi et al., 2014), in comparison to healthy controls, were
impaired to all the ToM dimensions investigated. Persons
with bulimia showed impairment in third-person ToM in the
allocentric perspective and in second-order ToM, but not in
third-person ToM in the egocentric perspective or in first-order
ToM. Finally, persons with congenital heart diseases showed
impairment to third-person ToM, both in the egocentric and the
allocentric perspective, but not in first-person or second-order
ToM (Chiavarino et al., 2015). Globally, these studies testify to
the necessity to have a tool able to separately investigate different
ToM dimensions in clinical samples.
With the aim of verifying whether the results from Th.o.m.a.s.
could be explained merely by differences in communicative-
pragmatic abilities, Bosco et al. (2014b) created a second set
of criteria for the evaluation of the participants’ performance.
The findings showed that communicative-pragmatic abilities, at
least for the level required to answer Th.o.m.a.s., do not affect
performance.
The goal of this research is to further investigate the validity
of Th.o.m.a.s. by assessing its reliability, its dimensional structure
and some aspects of items functioning and criterion validity in a
sample of healthy people. In particular, we expect to find a fair
to good inter-raters reliability and a good internal consistency.
We also expect to find a correlation between Th.o.m.a.s. Scale B
and another ToM task, the Strange Stories (Happé, 1994;Mazzola
and Camaioni, 2002), because both tasks investigate third-
person ToM in an allocentric perspective. For what concerns
the dimensional structure we expect to find four dimensions
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corresponding to the four scales, namely first-person ToM
(Scale A), third-person allocentric ToM (scale B), third-person
egocentric ToM (Scale C) and second-order ToM (Scale D), and
an invariant functioning of items across gender and across age
groups.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Two nearly equal-sized samples of preadolescent/adolescent and
adult volunteers, all native speakers of Italian, were recruited in a
number of local schools, university faculties, social organizations,
sports clubs in two Italian cities (Torino and Asti). All the
participants took part voluntarily in the study; all of them, as
well as their parents when underage, were informed about the
procedures and gave their informed consent. The study was
approved by the Bio-ethical Committee of the University of
Turin.
None of them resulted to have a history of significant
neurological and/or psychiatric disorders or drug or alcohol
abuse. During the recruitment phase, an assistant to the research
(with a degree in Psychology) handed to the prospective
participants an informative letter explaining the goal of the
research. The letter also asked the subjects to withdraw from the
study if they did not feel like participating or in the event of a
past history of neurological or psychiatric disease, current or past
history of alcohol or drug abuse, and current or past history of a
psychotherapy.
The preadolescents and adolescents sample was composed
of 80 participants (42 females), ranging in age from 11 to 17
(M = 14.0; SD = 2.25), with an education ranging from 5 to
12 years (M = 8.53; SD = 2.3). The adults sample consisted of
76 individuals (35 females), ranging in age from 20 to 67 years
(M = 40.72; SD= 11.93) with an education ranging from 5 to 18
(M = 12.16; SD= 4.27).
Two participants were excluded from the analysis due to
technical problems with the audio recording of the interview.
MATERIALS
Theory of Mind Assessment Scale
(Th.o.m.a.s.)
Th.o.m.a.s. (see the references above) consists of 371 open-ended
questions that ask the interviewee to present and discuss her
reflections about the functioning of ToM in everyday life (see
Appendix A in Supplementary Material for the complete list
of items), also with the aid of examples that she may provide
spontaneously or after a specific request from the interviewer.
The architecture underlying the interview groups the
questions in four scales that focus on the various internal or social
domains in which ToM plays a role.
• Scale A (I–Me)—First-order first-person ToM. It focuses on
how the interviewee (I) reflects on her ownmental states (Me).
1Previous versions of the tool included 39 questions; in the final version, two were
dropped because they turned out to be redundant.
• Scale B (Other–Self)—Allocentric third-person ToM.
These questions focus on how the interviewee thinks that
other persons (Other) reflect on their mental states (Self),
independently on her own position. This scale is akin to classic
third-person ToM task.
• Scale C (I–Other)—Egocentric third-person ToM. These
questions focus on how the interviewee (I) reflects on the
mental states of other actors (Other). While both scales B and
C investigate third-person ToM, the difference is that here it is
the interviewee’s positions that are highlighted, thus providing
a sort of bridge between first- and third-person ToM.
• Scale D (Other–Me)—Second-order first-person ToM. These
questions focus on how the interviewee conceives of the
knowledge that the others may have of her mental states, that
is how they (Other) reflect on her mental states (Me). The
abstract structure of these questions thus is akin to classic
second-order tasks.
The four scales are each divided into three subscales investigating
Awareness, Relation, and Realization, that is, respectively, how
the interviewee perceives different types of mental states, how he
recognizes the causal relations that hold between these mental
states and between them and an agent’s visible behaviors, and
how he conceives of the possibility of affecting the mental
states of his own and those of the others. The types of mental
states investigated are the most basic that must be comprised
in a complex cognitive architecture (Olson et al., 2006; Tirassa
et al., 2006a,b; Tirassa and Bosco, 2008), namely positive and
negative emotions, volitional states like desires and intentions,
and epistemic states like knowledge and beliefs.
The replies given by the interviewee are organized into a
grid (Table 1) of which the scales and subscales are the columns
and the types of mental states investigated are the rows. Each
cell is thus located at the intersection of two of the dimensions
considered, and each question, focusing on a specific aspect of
the features of ToM, refers to one cell of the table.
For example, question [3]: When you feel bad, do you
understand the reason why you feel like that? explores how the
interviewee reflects on her own negative feelings (dimensions
investigated: Awareness and Negative emotions); question [18]:
Do the others try to fulfill their desires? asks the interviewee
to reason about how the others’ desires and feelings are
interconnected (dimensions investigated: Relation and Desires);
and so on for each question.
Strange Stories
In addition to Th.o.m.a.s., the participants were also
administered a selection of six items from the Italian version of
the Strange Stories (Mazzola and Camaioni, 2002), originally
devised by Happé (1994). Each story contains two test questions:
the comprehension question (e.g., Was what X said true?), and
the justification question(s) (e.g., Why did X say that?). The
latter question requires an inference about the speaker’s/actor’s
intentions; correct performance requires attribution of mental
states such as desires, beliefs or intentions, and sometimes
higher-order mental states such as one character’s belief about
what another character knows.
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TABLE 1 | A graphic representation of the structure of Th.o.m.a.s.
Scale A (I–Me) First-order first-person ToM B (Other–Self) Allocentric third-person ToM
Subscale Awareness Relation Realization Awareness Relation Realization
Beliefs x 5 10 x 15 (15a) 20
Desires 7 (7a) 8 (8a) 9 17 (17a) 18 (18a) 19
Positive emotions 1 (1a) 2 6 (6a) 11 (11a) 12 16 (16a)
Negative emotions 3 (3a) 4 x 13 (13a) 14 x
Scale C (I–Other) Egocentric third-person ToM D (Other–Me) Second-order first-person ToM
Beliefs x 25 (25a) 28 x 35 (35a) 38
Desires 29 26 x 39 x x
Positive emotions 21 (21a) 22 27 31 (31a) 32 37
Negative emotions 23 (23a) 24 x 33 (33a) 34 x
Numbers in the table (e.g., 1) refer to the same-numbered question; numbers in parentheses (e.g., 1a) refer to the “Why not version” of the same question; for example, if the subject
responds negatively to question [1]: “Do you ever feel emotions that make you feel good?” the interviewer poses question [1a]: “Why not?”. Some cells contain an (x) because not all
the intersections between two dimensions have a relevant question, since in some cases this would sound contrived. For example, no question asking whether the interviewee is aware
of his own beliefs is posed, as it may be assumed that if one were not, one would just be unable to talk about them. Adapted from Bosco et al. (2009).
Procedure
The participants completed the Th.o.m.a.s. interview and Strange
stories task individually with a research assistant. The material
was administered at school (adolescents) or at home (adults);
the session generally takes about 1 h. The research assistants
participating in the research were in total three. They all
had a degree in psychology and were trained by two of the
authors (I.G. and F.M.B.) on how to administer the interviews.
First they received an oral explanation of the aim and the
procedure for the administration of Th.o.m.a.s. by I.G. or F.M.B.
They then practiced in the administration of Th.o.m.a.s. to
a test subject (not included in the experimental sample) and
transcribed the interview. The transcription was then examined
by I.G. or F.M.B.: if it was not satisfactory (e.g., because the
interviewer had suggested one or more answers), the error
was demonstrated and explained and another test interview
was conducted (again the subject was not included in the
sample). The procedure was repeated until the interview was
conducted satisfactorily (two/three test interviews always did the
job).
With the authorization of the interviewees or of their parents
all the interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed to
enable oﬄine scoring. The participants were informed that their
participation was voluntary and that the aim and contents of the
research would be explained at the end of the session.
The responses both to Th.o.m.a.s. and to the Strange Stories
were rated by another research assistant, blind to the aims of
the study; moreover, 29% of the sessions were rated by a second
independent judge, again blind to the aim and the scope of the
research, in order to evaluate the inter-rater agreement. In rating
Th.o.m.a.s. the judges were instructed to assign each answer a
score from 0 to 4, according to given rating criteria (see Appendix
B in Supplementary Material), and to insert it in the relevant cell
of the scoring grid.
In rating the Strange Stories task the judges followed the
criterion originally proposed by Happé (1994), namely to assign
0 to an incorrect answer and 1 to a correct one. A score of 1
was attributed when the individual replied correctly to both the
comprehension and the justification question.
The inter-rater reliability among the scores assigned by
the two independent judges at the Strange Stories task was
calculated using Intraclass Correlation Coefficent; the ICC was
0.94, indicating a very high agreement between raters.
Data Analysis
The averages of the scores at each Th.o.m.a.s. scale and those of
the Strange Stories task were inserted in the dataset and used for
part of the analysis.
In order to assess the inter-rater agreement an Intraclass
Correlation Coefficient2 (ICC) was calculated on the 29% of the
sample for which the Th.o.m.a.s. interviews had been encoded
by two judges. As a rule of thumb, values between 0.41 and 0.60
stand for fair reliability, those between 0.61 and 0.80 formoderate
reliability, and those between 0.81 and 0.90 for substantial
reliability (Shrout, 1998). Cronbach’s alpha was used to evaluate
the internal consistency of the scores on the four scales.
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was applied to assess the
goodness of fit of the 4-factors model representing the four
scales, namely A (I–Me), B (Other–Self), C (I–Other), and D
(Other–Me). The analysis was performed on the covariance
matrix of the 37 items (Appendix C), using Lisrel 8.72 (Jöreskog
and Sörbom, 1996). Because of the small size of the sample,
Maximum Likelihood method (ML) without correcting the chi-
square and standard errors was employed even though data
violated the multinormality condition (Mardia’s multivariate
omnibus test of skewness and kurtosis (2, 154) = 1711.8;
p < 0.001). The following criteria were used to evaluate
the fit of the model as acceptable: RMSEA < 0.08; CFI >
0.95; SRMR < 0.08 (Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Hu and
Bentler, 1995, 1999). In order to assess whether the tasks
composing the four scales require different levels of ToM
2In particular, the ICC type C1, which measures the absolute agreement in a
two-way random analysis of variance model for average measures, was adopted
(McGraw and Wong, 1996).
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ability the Friedman test was performed on the four average
scores.
A Rasch model for items with ordered response categories,
the Partial credit model as implemented in Winsteps (Linacre,
2009), was applied to assess the psychometric properties
of each unidimensional scale. Dimensionality was checked
by performing Principal component analysis (PCA) on the
residuals; scales for which the first eigenvalue was ≤2 were
considered unidimensional (Linacre, 2009). Scores reliability was
evaluated by the Person Separation index (PSEP), where values
≥1.50 are considered acceptable (Boone et al., 2014). Item quality
was assessed by Infit and Outfit statistics and values within the
0.7–1.3 range were considered satisfactory (Wright and Linacre,
1994). Differential item functioning (DIF) for gender and age
groups was evaluated: a DIF value > 0.64 logits (in absolute
value) with a p < 0.05 was considered indicative of the
persistence of a difference in item functioning across gender or
age groups, after controlling for differences in person location
(Boone et al., 2014).
Criterion validity was assessed as the difference in means
between adolescents (whose scores were expected to be lower)
and adults (whose scores were expected to be higher) and
as the correlation with the independent evaluation of ToM
provided by the Strange Stories. Multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA) was employed to assess the difference
in means between adolescents and adults on the four scales.
Such approach was needed because of the high correlation
between the dependent variables. Since the two groups were
about the same size, both multivariate and univariate tests
could be considered robust to departures from normality
and from homogeneous covariance matrices conditions3. To
assess the correlation between the scores at the Th.o.m.a.s.
and that at the Strange Stories task the Pearson coefficient
partialized for age and years of education and unpartialized was
calculated.
With the exception of CFA and Rasch analysis, all the analysis
were performed with SPSS 20.
RESULTS
Inter-Rater Agreement and Internal
Consistency
Overall, the inter-rater agreement was acceptable (Table 2). In
particular, scale A (first-person ToM: I–Me) and scale D (second-
order ToM: Other–Me) displayed fair reliability (0.59 and 0.49
respectively) whereas scales B and C, respectively investigating
allocentric third-person ToM (Other–Self) and egocentric third-
person ToM (I–Other), showed moderate reliability (0.65 and
0.71, respectively). All the four scales provided good results for
internal consistency. Cronbach’s alpha ranged from 0.86 to 0.89
(Table 2).
3As an additional check on the validity of the results of the parametric analysis
a non parametric MANOVA (Finch, 2005) and the Mann-Whitney test were
performed.
TABLE 2 | Inter-rater agreement (N = 45) and internal consistency (154) of
the four Th.o.m.a.s. scales.
Scale ICC alpha
A (I–Me) First-order first-person ToM 0.59 0.89
B (Other–Self) Allocentric third-person ToM 0.65 0.88
C (I–Other) Egocentric third-person ToM 0.71 0.89
D (Other–Me) Second-order (first-person) ToM 0.49 0.86
Factorial Structure
The theoretical model consisting of four latent variables
representing the four Th.o.m.a.s. scales fitted the data quite well:
χ
2
(623) = 1138.4, p < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.073 (CI 90% = 0.066–
0.080); CFI = 0.97 and SRMR = 0.058. All the loadings were high
and statistically significant (Figure 1). The correlations between
the four dimensions were very high, ranging from 0.94 to 1.00.
In order to assess which of the four scales can be discriminated
in a healthy sample, several more parsimonious models with 3,
2, and 1 factors were estimated; the chi-square difference test
and the Consistent Akaike Information Criterion (CAIC) were
used to compare nested and non-nested models respectively.
The bidimensional model that isolated the Scale B (Other–Self)
resulted in a statistically nonsignificant χ2 difference test when
compared to the 4-factors solution [χ2(5) = 9.6; p > 0.05] and
lower CAIC value; consequently, it was chosen as the model
which fitted the data best. In this solution with χ2(628) = 1148.0,
p < 0.001; RMSEA = 0.073 (CI 90% = 0.066–0.080); CFI
= 0.97, and SRMR = 0.058, all the loadings were statistically
significant and high, ranging from 0.59 to 0.81 (with a mean of
0.66 and 0.67 for the two factors) and the standardized covariance
was equal to 0.96. The unidimensional model, albeit adequate
in terms of fit indices, was not acceptable because it exhibited
a significant χ2 difference test when compared to the 4-factors
solution [χ2(6) = 20.8; p < 0.01]. Thus, in a healthy sample,
only two factors seem distinguishable: the one belonging to Scale
B (Other–Self) and a broader one composed by the other three
scales.
In order to investigate whether differences in the performance
at the different scales were detectable, we analyzed the means of
each scale. On average, the sample performed better on scale A
(I-Me: M = 3.50; SD = 0.49) than B (Other-Self: M = 3.32;
SD = 0.55), C (I-Other: M = 3.31; SD = 0.58) or D (Other-
Me: M = 3.30; SD = 0.55): the Friedman test resulted in a
significant overall effect [χ2(3) = 77.2; p < 0.001] and the post-
hoc analysis, with a Bonferroni correction applied, showed that
only the pairwise comparisons involving scale A (I-Me) were
statistically significant (p < 0.001).
Rasch Analysis
Considering the high correlations between the four factors
yielded by the CFA analysis, the Partial credit model was
estimated on the whole pool of 37 items. The PCA on residuals
signaled that more than one dimension were present as the
eigenvalues of the first three components were >2. Excluding
scale B, that resulted as a separate factor in the previous CFA
analysis, the eigenvalue criteria was not yet respected since the
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FIGURE 1 | Standardized solution of the four-factors CFA model of Th.o.m.a.s. (N = 154).
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TABLE 3 | Summary of the Partial credit model results.
Sub-scales PCA
(a)
PSEP
(b)
Infit
(c)
Outfit
(c)
DIF (d)
sex
DIF (d)
age
A 1.9 1.83 Item 2
Item 6
Item 2
Item 6
Item 1
Item 4
B 2.1 1.89 Item 16
Item 20
Item 16
Item 20
Item 18
Item 20 Item 16
Item 17
C 1.7 1.99 – – – Item 23
Item 26
D 2.1 1.82 – – – Item 38
(a) First eigenvalue of the Principal component analysis on residuals; (b) Person separation
index; (c) items with infit/outfit statistics out of the range 0.7–1.3; (d) Items with differential
functioning for sex or age (adolescents vs. adults).
first and the second eigenvalues were still >2. Therefore, the
four scales were analyzed separately, which yielded the results
summarized in Table 3.
Eigenvalue criteria were respected for scales A and C, slightly
above the cut-off for scales B and D. Reliability was good for
all the scales, giving scores with PSEP values > 1.5. All the
items of scales C and D showed acceptable values for Infit and
Oufit statistics and their functioning was invariant for gender.
The two scales resulted to be partially invariant with respect
to age groups: two items of scale C and one of scale D had a
non-negligible DIF value between adolescents and adults. Some
misfitting items were present in scales A and B; these scales
exhibited partial invariance for both gender and age groups.
Overall, two items (item 16 and item 20 of scale B) were
unsatisfactory on both infit/outfit and DIF statistics; in each scale
there were 6 or 7 well performing items. A content analysis
of unfitting items was performed, but since problematic items
were few and they were crucial to the instrument, all were
retained.
Criterion Validity
The Strange Stories (administered to 115 subjects, i.e., 74% of
the total sample) scores were used as an independent ToM
measure to assess the criterion validity of Th.o.m.a.s. In terms
of percentage of correct answers to all the six tasks, the
adults performed better than the adolescents. The difference
between the two percentages (68.6% for the adults, 48.8% for
the adolescents) was statistically significant [t-test for unequal
variances, t(63) = −2.03, p = 0.046].
As shown in Table 4, only Scale B (Other–Self), i.e.,
the scale investigating third-person ToM in an egocentric
perspective, correlated positively with the Strange Stories.
This correlation was statistically significant both when the
unpartialized coefficient was used and when the correlation was
adjusted for age and education.
As regards the difference between the means of
preadolescents/adolescents and those of the adults, the
MANOVA analysis yielded statistical significance for both
the omnibus F statistics and the four univariate F test (Table 5)4.
DISCUSSION
The Th.o.m.a.s. (Bosco et al., 2009; see Appendix A in
Supplementary Material) is a semi-structured interview
investigating Theory of Mind (ToM). The 37 open-ended
questions of which it is comprised are organized in four scales,
called A (I–Me), B (Other–Self), C (I–Other), and D (Other–
Me), each focusing on one of the knowledge domains in which
ToM manifests itself. The questions leave the interviewee free to
articulate her thoughts; she is also invited to propose examples
taken from her own biography or anyway from the real world,
and thus to make her understanding of the mental states both
of her own and of the others explicit and to reflect upon them.
Th.o.m.a.s has been administered to persons with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia (Bosco et al., 2009), sex offenders (Castellino
et al., 2011), persons suffering from alcohol abuse (Bosco et al.,
2014a), persons with congenital heart disease (Chiavarino
et al., 2015), and persons with bulimia (Laghi et al., 2014). In
each of these cases Th.o.m.a.s. has proved a useful clinical tool
able to discriminate between healthy control and non-healthy
participants.
The aim of this study was to assess the validity and the
reliability of the Th.o.m.a.s. scores. In particular inter-rater
agreement, internal consistency, dimensional structure, items’
functioning, and criterion validity were evaluated in a sample of
156 healthy adolescents, and adults.
Internal consistency of the scores in the four scales composing
Th.o.m.a.s. ranged from good to really good as defined in the
literature (De Vellis et al., 1991). Reliability was satisfactory
also when evaluated by Partial credit model. The inter-rater
agreement was acceptable, ranging from fair tomoderate (Shrout,
1998).
The dimensional structure of the Th.o.m.a.s. scores was
explored with both CFA and Rasch analysis, yielding divergent
results. The CFA model representing the four theoretical scales
fitted the data very well, but factors were highly correlated and a
more parsimonious two factors model fitted the data equally well.
Correlation was also very high (0.96) in the latter model, which
might suggest that a single broader ToM dimension existed.
By contrast, the PCA of model residuals in the Partial credit
model analysis showed that the 37 items of the instrument were
not indicators of a single latent construct, but belonged to four
distinct scales, corresponding to those that were theoretically
expected.
As reported in literature, factor analysis and Rasch modeling
can produce divergent results in terms of dimensionality under
specific conditions regarding, for example, the proportion of
items per dimension, the level of correlation between dimensions,
and a non-linear relationship between items scores and the
latent dimension (McDonald, 1965; Smith, 1996; Waugh and
Chapman, 2005; Yu et al., 2007). The reason for the discrepancy
4The nonparametric MANOVA and the Mann-Whitney test statistics also resulted
in statistically significant differences.
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TABLE 4 | Pearson correlations between Th.o.m.a.s. scales and the Strange Stories scores.
Scale A I–Me First-order
first-person ToM
Scale B Other–Self,
Allocentric third-person ToM
Scale C I–Other, Egocentric
third-person ToM
Scale D Other–Me, Second-order
(first-person) ToM
Unpartialized 0.136 0.229* 0.126 0.119
Partialized for age
and education
0.071 0.191* 0.056 0.056
*p < 0.05.
TABLE 5 | MANOVA results on preadolescents/adolescents vs. adults difference in means on the four Th.o.m.a.s. scales.
Scale Preadolescents and adolescentsa (N = 80) Adultsa (N = 74) Univariate F statistics and η2
A
I–Me, First-order first-person ToM
3.21 (0.48) 3.82 (0.25) F(1, 152) = 93.73; p < 0.0001, 0.38
B
Other–Self, Allocentric third-person ToM
2.97 (0.46) 3.70 (0.36) F(1, 152) = 116.41; p < 0.0001, 0.43
C
I–Other, Egocentric third-person ToM
2.94 (0.51) 3.71 (0.35) F(1, 152) = 117.98; p < 0.0001, 0.43
D
Other–Me, Second-order first-person ToM
2.98 (0.49) 3.66 (0.35) F(1, 152) = 95.70; p < 0.0001, 0.38
a Mean and (standard deviation); Multivariate F statistics associated to Pillai’s trace: F(4, 149) = 35.57; p < 0.001.
between CFA and Partial credit model in our study lies most
likely in the high correlation between the four scale scores. As
shown in a simulation study by Smith (1996), Rasch analysis
works better than factor analysis when dimensions are highly
correlated and worse when correlations are low. Moreover, Rasch
analysis, which does not rely upon correlations, is preferable to
factor analysis when the variables are not continuous (Boone
et al., 2014). In the light of these remarks, and according to Rasch
results, Th.o.m.a.s. can be considered an instrument assessing
four distinct, even if highly correlated, dimensions of ToM.
The high level of correlation between the dimensions scores
deserves further consideration. A certain amount of correlation is
theoretically expected, since the four dimensions are components
of a broader construct, namely ToM abilities; however, the level
of correlation was probably inflated due to some methodological
features: (i) the uniformity of the test structure, which is entirely
composed of open-ended questions; (ii) the persistence of the
same persons as raters; and (iii) the uniformity of the contents
investigated (all the scales assess mental states related to beliefs,
emotions and desires). Furthermore, in healthy adults these
different dimensions of ToM are substantially well integrated
(which may not be the case in clinical populations), producing
high scores overall the four scales. Younger people obtained
lower scores, which might also have contributed to the inflation
of correlations (Bewick et al., 2003).
Overall, the performance of the Partial credit models in each
of the four scales was satisfactory. Only six items out of 37
showed poor fitting and scales resulted to be partially invariant
with respect to age and gender. In fact, only in few cases item
locations (difficulties) were not the same between adolescents and
adults with the same person location (ability) or between male
and female with the same person location.
Regarding the comparison between mean scales scores, the
only significant difference found was that the sample performed
better to Scale A (I–Me) with respect to B (Other–Self) and C
(I–Other). This is in line with other studies in the literature
to the effect that first-person ToM is generally the easiest
to handle (see also Lysaker et al., 2005). The sample also
performed better to Scale A (I–Me) than D (Other–Me). This
is again in line with the literature, according to which healthy
children find first-order ToM tasks easier than second-order
ones (Perner and Wimmer, 1985; the two types of tasks are
respectively explored in Scales A and D of Th.o.m.a.s.). This is
also the case in clinical samples: first-order ToM is easier than
second-order to persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, both
when evaluated with Th.o.m.a.s. (Bosco et al., 2009) and with
other classic false-belief tasks (e.g., Mazza et al., 2001). Instead,
the difference between allocentric and egocentric third-person
ToM has remained quite unexplored in the literature about
mentalizing. A previous study using Th.o.m.a.s. in sex offenders
(Castellino et al., 2011) found that they performed worse on
Scale B (allocentric) than C (egocentric third-person ToM),
showing that the comparison between the two perspectives
may be interesting in some cases. However, further studies
with clinical samples are necessary in order to investigate
this issue.
We employed the Strange Stories task as an independent ToM
measure to analyze criterion validity. Statistical analysis showed
that it correlated positively with Scale B (Other–Self: allocentric
third-person ToM), but not with the other three Th.o.m.a.s.
scales. This is as expected, since the Strange Stories task measures
third-person, allocentric ToM.
Finally, MANOVA results confirmed the expectation
that the scores would increase from adolescents to
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adults, thus adding further evidence to the idea that the
development of ToM continues during childhood, through
adolescence (Choudhury et al., 2006; Bosco et al., 2014b;
Brizio et al., 2015) and into adulthood (Maylor et al., 2002;
Dumontheil et al., 2010).
In conclusion, our results supported the theoretical distinction
among the four scales. Despite the strong correlations between
them in the present sample of healthy people, they should not be
considered secondary dimensions of a broader but homogeneous
ToM factor or treated as source of noise in the data. Actually, at
least two theoretically sound features emerged, namely that Scale
A (I–Me) is easier than the others and that only Scale B (Other–
Self) was correlated to a third-person ToM test, the Strange
Stories task. This conclusion is also supported by previous
researches finding different patterns of performance on the four
scales in different clinical samples (Laghi et al., 2014; Chiavarino
et al., 2015).
Future research directions basically coincide with the attempts
to overcome the current limitations of Th.o.m.a.s. and its use.
First, the size of the healthy sample ought to be steadily increased
from the current figure of 156. Furthermore, it will be necessary
to provide the normative data for the Italian population and to
administer additional ToM tests beyond the Strange Stories to
provide further empirical evidence on construct validity (see for
example Brüne et al., 2016).
It will also be necessary to understand the cultural properties
of Th.o.m.a.s., that is the extent to which it is embedded in how
native Italians, or Europeans, or Westerners conceive of ToM, or
in universal features of human social cognition. Of course, this
might then yield modifications either in the instrument itself or
at least in how scores would be given to members of different
cultures.
Still another direction of development which can be expected
to yield interesting results is the use of Th.o.m.a.s. with different
types of clinical populations. Those in which it has already
been employed (namely, to repeat, schizophrenia, criminal
sexual behaviors, alcohol abuse, congenital heart disease, and
bulimia) do exhibit differences in their respective profiles of ToM
(mal)functioning. Given the importance of ToM in our species,
its delicacy, and its dependence on individual and contextual
factors, this comes as no surprise; it is analogously reasonable
to expect further differences to be found in other conditions of
clinical interest.
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